Le référendum sur la Constitution met les élites politiques néerlandaises à l'épreuve

Alors que les Pays-Bas sont traditionnellement considérés comme l'un des Etats les plus favorables au projet d'intégration politique de l'UE, le référendum du 1er juin portant sur la ratification du projet de Constitution européenne semble de plus en plus voué à se solder par une victoire du "non". Dans cette étude rédigée pour le Centre for European Policy StudiesBen Crum analyse les origines du sentiment anti-européen au sein de l'opinion néerlandaise.

Alors que les Pays-Bas sont traditionnellement considérés comme l’un des Etats les plus favorables au projet d’intégration politique de l’UE, le référendum du 1er juin portant sur la ratification du projet de Constitution européenne semble de plus en plus voué à se solder par une victoire du « non ». Dans cette étude rédigée pour le Centre for European Policy StudiesBen Crum analyse les origines du sentiment anti-européen au sein de l’opinion néerlandaise.

While a substantial part of the Dutch electorate thus remains positively inclined towards Europe, there also appears considerable ground for rather eurosceptic positions. The emergence of the latter sentiment has to be seen within a wider context. A first rallying point of anti-EU sentiment in the Netherlands was the net contributor debate in the run up to the multi-annual financial agreement of Berlin in 2000, which in fact was to a considerable extent provoked by the position of the government and its Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm (who is still in office, albeit in a rather different government). Subsequently, the European decisions to adopt the euro and to carry through with the 2004 enlargement have had a rather mixed reception in the Netherlands. It was not so much straightforward opposition to these decisions, but rather the feeling that there was no way that popular reservations could effectively be brought to bear upon them that fuelled popular resentment. Thus, the general perception created was that these decisions were imposed by Brussels upon the Netherlands, rather than that they were arrived at with the active and constructive participation of Dutch representatives. The uneasy handling of the Iraq crisis and the recent wrangling over the Stability and Growth Pact further confirmed the impression that, from its position as original insider, the Netherlands has come to be of marginal influence in the new, enlarged European Union. 

Another background factor that has provided fertile ground for the articulation of eurosceptic sentiments in the Netherlands is a widespread disenchantment with the political establishment. Most notably, this disenchantment came to the fore in the 2002 national elections when the List Pim Fortuyn secured a share of 17% of the total vote. Fortuyn very much positioned himself in opposition against the established political parties and played upon xenophobic tendencies, including also a rather critical stance towards European cooperation. After Fortuyn’s assassination, a plethora of initiatives are competing for the political ground that he has left behind. At the same time, on the left side of the political spectrum, a similar anti-establishment and anti-EU ticket has since 1994 allowed the Socialist Party to steadily expand its presence to 6% of the Parliament. Since all main political parties in the present referendum campaign – from the Greens on the left to the Liberal-Conservatives (VVD) on the right – are campaigning in favour of the EU Constitution, the referendum is liable to be turned into an occasion to register a protest vote by the politically disenchanted. 

Thus, the Dutch referendum on the EU Constitution appears as a major test of the ability of Dutch politicians to convince the electorate that Dutch interests can effectively be represented within a deeper and enlarged Union. It is striking, however, that most of them seem rather reluctant to take up this challenge in the face of so little public enthusiasm. So far the government’s main message has been that the real campaign has yet to start. It has called upon social groups to actively promote their support for the Constitution, but the statements by Prime Minister Balkenende and his Secretary of State for European Affairs, Atzo Nicolaï, convey more of a sense of duty than genuine enthusiasm. 

Please click here to read the CEPS paper in full.