L’Union européenne et la Russie à la croisée des chemins

L’UE doit adopter une nouvelle approche de coopération envers la Russie, dont une adhésion partielle à une zone de libre-échange, écrivent Iris Kempe et Cornelius Ochmann.

Iris Kempe est une spécialiste de la Russie à l’American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. Cornelius Ochmann est un spécialiste des relations entre l’UE et la Russie à la fondation Bertelsmann.

"The European Union and Russia are compelled to be strategic partners – through their geographic situation, their common history, through social and economic obligations.

Currently, the EU’s relations with Russia need new impetus. The EU’s ability to manoeuvre is hindered by the financial crisis, which has developed into a crisis of the Union’s political integration. The member states’ and European institutions’ policies toward Russia are dominated by the rhetoric of a partnership for modernization, and Europe is interested in a guarantor for security and in reliable energy suppliers. The Putin system is challenging European expectations by questioning European norms and values. The present Russian government is interested in European support for modernization, first and foremost in technical aspects such as implementing WTO accession or introducing visa-free travel.  

Formally, bilateral relations are structured by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1997. Although the PCA was originally negotiated to last 10 years, it is automatically renewed on an annual basis unless one party decides to cancel it. The PCA no longer matches the political realities. For seven years, both sides have been called to work out and then ratify a new bilateral agreement. Before that can be done, however, it is necessary to clarify fundamental questions and only then, based on this analysis, develop new means of cooperation.

Since the parliamentary elections in December 2011, the modernisation debate in Russia has also sharpened politically. At first, irregularities in the parliamentary elections and general dissatisfaction with the government led to ongoing public protests reflecting the interests of a new middle class. However, there are have not to date been charismatic personalities to spearhead the protests. There is little in the way of plans; nevertheless, the protests remain a challenge to the legitimacy and the performance of the Putin system, and so far, popular resentment has not been mollified by modern governmental measures. The system has reacted with restrictive methods. Before the 2012 summer break the Russian parliament, which has a majority of Putin supporters, rapidly passed a series of laws that take aim at civil society activities.

Over the last two years, Russia has pursued the two following foreign policy priorities: efforts to become a global economic player, and influence over its neighbouring countries. Russia’s global efforts are visible through its membership in the G20, the G8, its accession to the WTO, its efforts to join the OECD, and its status as a BRIC state. The common denominator among these forums is economic interest; common values, by contrast, play a subordinate role.

To date, the EU has only adapted its policies to new developments in the Putin system to a limited extent. For itself and its neighbours, Russia sees the Eurasian Union as an alternative to the EU. To give this Union emphasis vis-à-vis the EU, the Russian government presents itself as speaker for and framer of the Eurasian Union which leads to incomprehension in the EU. From Brussels’ point of view, the Eurasian Union remains an administrative paper tiger as long as Ukraine is not a member. Politically, the EU member states have criticised Russia’s dominance over its neighbours. The EU only recognises Russia’s role in the Eurasian Union under the condition that Russia is limited to shaping it in accordance with the regulations of the WTO.

Bilateral criticism is driving relations between the EU and Russia into a dead end. Getting out of it will require a broader political discourse, the development of networks, and academic policy analysis of the situation in Russia, upon which new adjustments in relations could be made. The results could flow into a new agreement, one whose European reach would become apparent as the EU member states examined it as part of the ratification process.

The modernisation of Russia and the country’s conspicuous shortcomings on the path to being a global shaper of politics and economics remain challenges on Russia’s political agenda, as well as for its European partners. This results from the country’s geopolitical and economic importance. A key moment on the way to these goals would be pluralistic discourse about modernization within the country, combined with Western expertise. In addition, there is a need for international experience, which is available in international organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF.

However, Russia is much too independent and energy-rich to let itself be influenced by demands from the outside. Western actors would be well advised to develop approaches together with Russian partners. The shortfall in common values is increasingly turning into a lack of knowledge about each other – including actors, processes and policy areas. From a new institutional approach, from analyses, and from newly constructed networks a road map to a new basic agreement between Russia and Europe that is attractive and gives directions to both sides can be developed.

Successful realignment of the EU’s relations with Russia is a contemporary question of Europe’s ability to act with a single voice, guided by member states that are tied to Russia through common interests and values: Germany, Finland and Poland. The EU will only be an attractive partner for a modern Russia if the Union is capable of overcoming its finance crisis.

To reach that goal, the EU must develop and implement new forms of institutional cooperation, such as tiered integration through partial membership in a free-trade zone. Success in EU-Russian partnership is a global driving force for deepening and enhancing European integration.

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