Willkommen in Nordzypern - autonomes Staatsgebilde innerhalb der Europäischen Union

75 %
der griechisch-stämmigen Zyprioten stimmten
bei einem Referendum zum Annan-Plan gegen die
Wiedervereinigung Zyperns, während 65 % der
türkisch-stämmigen Zyprioten sich für die
Wiedervereinigung aussprachen. In seinem vom Centre
for European Policy Studies (CEPS) veröffentlichten
Artikel untersucht 

Michael Emerson 

mögliche Zukunftsszenarien.

The EU institutions and
at least 23 if not 24 of the actual or incoming
member states are deeply disappointed with the
Greek Cypriot leadership that recommended the
no vote. On the other hand the EU institutions
and same 23 or 24 member states will want to
help Turkish Northern Cyprus, especially
because prime ministers Talat of northern
Cyprus and Erdogan of Turkey succeeded in
out-manoeuvering President Denktas who had also
recommended a no vote.

It would not be difficult
now for the EU to help Northern Cyprus, and to
do this in a way that could begin a process of
political re-assessment by the Greek Cypriots
over what they have just done.

By voting yes to the
Annan Plan for re-unification of the island and
for its accession to the EU Northern Cyprus has
demonstrated with clear democratic legitimacy
that it is no longer a secessionist entity
seeking recognition as an independent state.
Since the EU has itself never recognised the
earlier attempted secession it follows that
Northern Cyprus must be part of the Republic of
Cyprus, which the Greek Cypriot government has
always claimed to be the one and only Cyprus.
Moreover many Turkish Cypriots have Republic of
Cyprus passports, which means that they also
now become EU citizens. All other Turkish
Cypriots born on the island can acquire
Republic of Cyprus passports upon simple
request, and these will now bear the insignia
of the EU. 

Northern Cyprus is for
the time being entirely autonomous, but this is
now only so because the Greek Cypriot side
refused the Annan Plan that would have provided
a constitution defining the distribution of
competences between the federal and entity
levels. 

However Northern Cyprus
is able now unilaterally to adopt laws,
regulations and policies that are compliant
with the EU acquis, and should do so in the
first place for those elements of market, trade
and customs regimes that would facilitate
lifting of the trade embargo. The EU is used to
dealing with federal states such as Belgium of
Germany, in which various EU policies are
implemented at sub-state level. Cyprus would
for the time being become an unusual case of a
federal bi-communal member state, in which the
central level of government had by default put
itself into the situation of having zero
jurisdiction in one entity. 

The EU should therefore
treat Northern Cyprus as part of the EU
territory. There would be direct consultations
between the European Commission and Northern
Cyprus over the sequencing and priorities for
adoption of EU compliant laws and regulations.
First priority might be given for example for
the technical standards for the export of
citrus fruits, which is the main export
commodity that Northern Cyprus has to offer for
the time being. For the most important tourist
sector there should be an opening up of direct
flight connections with Northern Cyprus. The
Northern Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and the
European Commission could between them be the
relevant authority for supervising these
matters. The tourist sector would be set to
enter a new phase of investment and growth
along the beautiful Northern coast of the
island. The EU would also open up its normal
instruments of economic aid for investment,
training, education and technical assistance.
All Turkish Cypriots obtaining their Republic
of Cyprus passports would secure full EU
citizens’ rights for movement, employment
and residence anywhere in the EU, subject only
to the various transitional arrangements agreed
in the Treaty of Accession.  The European
Commission has powers to execute many useful
measures on its own authority, with its
decisions taken by simple majority of the
members of the
Commission.   

However the Greek Cypriot
leadership would be invited to cooperate to the
maximum extent. It is welcome news that the
Greek Cypriot side has immediately said that it
wants to help the Turkish Cypriots. The EU
might also negotiate directly with Turkey over
an immediate beginning to the reduction of its
military presence in Northern
Cyprus.   

Some Greek Cypriots might
complain that the Turkish Cypriots were being
excessively favoured, since they would not have
ceded any territory, or properties to Greek
Cypriot displaced persons. But of course the
Turkish Cypriots did agree to restitute land
and property in accordance with the Annan Plan
at the level of the government and the people
through the referendum. 

The new status quo would
indeed be favourable to the Turkish Cypriots.
The Greek Cypriots sought to exploit the EU
Helsinki agreement to accept Cyprus’
accession without necessarily conditioning this
on the re-unification of the island. The Greek
Cypriots perceived an opportunity to harden the
terms of their bargaining, apparently believing
that they had nothing to lose. However it now
appears that they made an unfortunate political
miscalculation of their own interests. They
seemed not to have appreciated how easily the
advantages of the status quo could be reversed,
depending only upon political assessments on
the EU side over which side had been
unreasonable. 

These new realities will
surely come to be understood by the Greek
Cypriots. The population may then, in due
course, come to the view that they had been
ill-advised by President Papadopoulos to vote
no, and well advised by the former Presidents
Clerides and Vassiliou to vote yes. In due
course democratic processes in Greek Cyprus
should lead to a change of government, or of
policy, or both. The new regime, of Northern
Cyprus as an autonomous entity of the European
Union, would therefore be only transitional.
When the Greek Cypriot side is ready,
negotiations can be resumed, maybe on the basis
of the Annan Plan, maybe on some other basis.
But both sides would have to agree, otherwise
the new status quo would persist. 

The Greek Cypriot side
has walked into a political-constitutional trap
of its own making. The EU cannot now refuse
recognise both the secession of Northern Cyprus
from the Republic of Cyprus and at the same
time its place as part of the Republic of
Cyprus and the EU. The return of Northern
Cyprus to a properly organised placed in the
workings of the federation would now be taking
place had it not been denied by the Greek
Cypriots. 

The new status quo –
with a fully autonomous sub-state entity
forming part of the European Union – could
also prove to be an interesting institutional
innovation to bear in mind for other cases of
unresolved ethno-secessionist conflicts, for
example Kosovo. It shows that the EU is a
remarkably adaptable institution, with
ingenious capabilities to find
politico-institutional solutions in conformity
with its underlying ideology. Therefore
enlargement day on 1 May need not be marred by
the half-failure of the Cyprus referendum. The
whole of Cyprus accedes to the EU and the new
political situation is one conducive to a
permanent solution in due course, but there is
no hurry.

Michael Emerson

is Senior Research Fellow at CEPS.

For more analyses, visit the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) website

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