Zügige Annäherung zwischen EU und Ukraine?

Der 1. Februar 2005 stellte einen Wendepunkt in den Beziehungen zwischen der Ukraine und der EU dar. Im Rahmen der ‚Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik‘ der EU nahmen die beiden Seiten einen Aktionsplan zur Stärkung der bilateralen Beziehungen und zehn „zusätzliche Maßnahmen“ an, die den Aktionsplan „weiter stärken und bereichern“ sollen. Hierüber schreibt Marius Vahl vom Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).

As the Action Plan was negotiated between the EU and the Kuchma regime and was finalized before the presidential elections, this List in effect constitutes the EU’s response to the Orange Revolution, and thus deserves further attention.

The List has already been criticized as being cosmetic and not providing anything new. Indeed, many of the items on the List are essentially reformulations of the corresponding items in the Action Plan. This applies for instance to EU support for Ukraine’s accession to the WTO and the language used on enhanced co-operation in foreign and security policy, although the proposal to invite Ukraine to associate with EU declarations on foreign and security issues is not mentioned in the Action Plan. 

The List further implies a greater intensity given to the process of deepening EU-Ukraine relations. On trade and economic relations, work on liberalization of trade in steel products and textiles, and contacts to enable Ukraine to be granted market economy status, will be “intensified”, the review of the possibility of free trade will be “accelerated”, and the EU would “step up” support to Ukraine for approximation to EU legislation. 

Other items on the List represent important concessions by the EU. While the Action Plan calls for “a constructive dialogue on visa facilitation, … with a view to preparing for future negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement”, the List calls for consideration of options to facilitate the granting of visas in connection with “negotiations to be held … before the next EU-Ukraine summit”. 

A commitment to the conclusion of a new upgraded agreement has been one of key items on Ukraine’s wish list. In the first EU proposals in March 2003, full implementation of the existing Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) was considered a “necessary precondition for any new development”. Only then would the EU consider any new agreements that would “build on” and “supplement existing contractual relations”. There has been considerable change to the EU’s position, and the List calls for “early consultations on an enhanced agreement …, to replace the PCA at the end of its initial ten-year period” [i.e. in early 2008)]. 

But progress on some of these key issues depends on a number of specified conditions carried over from the Action Plan. “Early consultations” on a new enhanced agreement will thus take place only after the “political priorities” of the Action Plan are addressed. The granting of market economy status requires that a number of issues including price-formation and control of state aid in Ukraine are resolved. As in the Action Plan, it is emphasized that progress in negotiations on a readmission agreement is “essential” for an agreement on visa facilitation. By implication, whether or not the List leads to a significantly strengthened bilateral relationship in the short term thus depends mainly on Ukrainian reform efforts. 

The List also uses language that implies that Ukraine is to become a priority for the EU. On the issue of people-to-people contacts, Ukraine is to be given “priority access” to the Erasmus Mundus student exchange programme, and a special internship programme for young Ukrainians will be considered. Relations will also be strengthened in key sectors, through the establishment of a high-level energy dialogue, an upgrade of the environmental dialogue, and by making Ukraine a priority in the planned extension of the Trans-European Networks. 

A similar conclusion can be drawn from the provision calling for up to 250 million euros in loans to be made available to Ukraine from the European Investment Bank. This constitutes half of the total EIB funding available to the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and represents a clear shift in EU priorities towards Ukraine, and away from other CIS countries such as Russia, previously the only CIS country to receive EIB financing. 

Indeed, the Action Plan and the List represent a sea change in EU policy towards the CIS. Until now, Russia has been the main priority in EU policy towards the CIS, with any new initiatives first developed with Russia. The latter’s unwillingness to be a partner in the ENP entails that relations with other CIS countries such as Ukraine are decisively decoupled from relations with Russia. 

In the wake of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine is not only catching up with Russia, but moving ahead in terms of its relationship with Brussels. The continued absence of agreement on a ‘Road Map’ for the four bilateral ‘common spaces’ to be developed between the EU and Russia – the equivalent of the Action Plan between Ukraine and the EU – further highlight this important development. 

The List essentially accelerates the deepening of bilateral relations with Ukraine envisaged in the Action Plan. Many in EU conclude that this is a miserly response to the dramatic events in Ukraine in late 2004 and a new Ukrainian government determined to move towards EU membership. The EU remains sharply divided on the long-term goal for relations with Ukraine. Indeed, the Orange Revolution brings to the forefront the ongoing rebalancing of power and influence within the enlarged EU. A considerable number of (mainly new) member states, led by Poland, Lithuania and Hungary, are in favour of acknowledging Ukraine as a potential member of the EU. This has broad support in the increasingly assertive European Parliament. A majority within the EU however remain of the opinion that it is too early to acknowledge Ukraine’s membership aspirations. If the new Ukrainian government follows through on its planned reforms, this position is likely to become increasingly unsustainable.   

(This commentary was first published in the European Voice.)

For more analyses from the same source, visit the CEPS website.