Wieviel kostet eine Emissionsreduzierung um 30 %? – Makroökonomische Folge der Post-Kyoto-Klimapolit
Diese Studie analysiert die makroökonomischen Folgen einer Klimapolitik, die darauf abzielt, die Treibhausgasemissionen der Industrieländer um 30 % gegenüber dem Niveau von 1990 zu reduzieren. Diese Bemühungen sind in Übereinstimmung mit den Zielen der Europäischen Union, die globale Erwärmung der globalen Durchschnittstemperatur auf 2 % über dem vorindustriellen Durchschnitt zu begrenzen. Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen solch einer Politik können sehr unterschiedlich sein. Die gemeinsame Studie der MNP Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency und dem CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis beurteilt die makroökonomischen Folgen einer Post-Kyoto-Politik, die darauf hinausläuft, dass die Industrieländer ab 2020 mit erheblich reduzierten Emissionszielen leben müssen.
Diese Studie analysiert die makroökonomischen Folgen einer Klimapolitik, die darauf abzielt, die Treibhausgasemissionen der Industrieländer um 30 % gegenüber dem Niveau von 1990 zu reduzieren. Diese Bemühungen sind in Übereinstimmung mit den Zielen der Europäischen Union, die globale Erwärmung der globalen Durchschnittstemperatur auf 2 % über dem vorindustriellen Durchschnitt zu begrenzen. Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen solch einer Politik können sehr unterschiedlich sein. Die gemeinsame Studie der MNP Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency und dem CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis beurteilt die makroökonomischen Folgen einer Post-Kyoto-Politik, die darauf hinausläuft, dass die Industrieländer ab 2020 mit erheblich reduzierten Emissionszielen leben müssen.
This report analyses the macro-economic consequences of climate policy beyond the first budget period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012). It is assumed that in 2020 industrialised countries accept an emission reduction target that lies 30 percent below their 1990 levels. Such a regime fits with the EU strategy to keep the rise of mean global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius compared to the pre-industrial level.
Policy design strongly influences the costs of the abatement effort. In a cap-and-trade system, costs are mainly driven by the number of countries participating. The efficiency of any climate policy depends on the availability of cheap abatement options. The low cost options are mostly to be found in the developing countries. Hence, the participation of developing countries in an emission trading system is crucial to lower the costs.
If all countries join a global abatement coalition to reduce emissions and if emission markets are competitive, the costs of compliance for the Netherlands in 2020 are estimated to be 0.8 percent of National Income (NI)1 in a high growth scenario. However, if developing countries do not participate and only industrialised countries (Annex I) abate emissions, then the estimated costs increase up to 4.8 percent of NI. It is to be noted that Australia and the United States are assumed to join this abatement coalition, although these countries opted out of the Kyoto Protocol. In comparison, the compliance costs of the Kyoto Protocol in 2010 in a high economic growth scenario are estimated to be 0.4 percent of Dutch NI. The Kyoto reduction target is only 6 percent below the 1990 level, but the abatement coalition is much smaller. In the longer term the climate goal (of limiting the maximum rise of global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius) requires a substantial stepping-up of emission reduction efforts after 2020. Earlier research, based on the same reference scenario, showed that the costs of compliance rise considerably after 2020.
For both the Netherlands and other industrialised countries, the costs of post-Kyoto policies will mainly stem from the import of emission permits. In the high economic growth scenario with all countries participating in emissions trading, the permit price equals 17 euros per ton CO2. In The Netherlands only 18% of the total reduction effort will be realised by domestic action. The domestic effort will mainly be driven by energy savings and structural shifts from energyintensive activities to services. This will entail a lower energy-intensity. Only a small fraction of domestic reductions will come from switching to low-carbon fuels (gas and carbon free energy). Reallocation of energy-intensive activities to foreign countries will be limited, because competitors all over the world will face an increase in production costs.
The costs of compliance also depend on the growth of emissions in the reference scenario. The above mentioned costs are evaluated against the background of a scenario with high economic growth. However, if a reference scenario with moderate economic and emissions growth is used as a background, then the costs to meet the 30% reduction target will fall accordingly. If in this moderate economic growth scenario both industrialised and developing countries join the abatement coalition and emission trading occurs in a fully competitive market, then the costs to the Netherlands in 2020 can be estimated to be only 0.2 percent of NI, instead of 0.8 percent.
The regional distribution of costs depends on the allocation of emission rights to countries. If this allocation is based on an equal per capita basis, developing countries will receive a surplus of emission rights over their current emission levels. Industrialised countries will get less. Industrialised countries will import emission permits in order to meet the requirement of their emission target. This will lead to income transfers from importing to exporting countries.
Generally, compliance with the climate target is more costly for the Netherlands than for the European Union on average. The reason is that the Netherlands has a relative high energy demand and the assumed allocation of rights on an equal per capita basis yields more stringent targets for the Netherlands. Alternative allocations based on historical emissions (grandfathering) or equal costs (equal burden sharing) will be favourable for the Netherlands. The analyses show that the costs of abatement can then be reduced by 25 percent.
These conclusions are based on a macro-economic analysis of climate policies. The costs are driven by a number of factors: the reduction target, economic growth and the related emissions in the baseline scenario, and the policy design. Given the reduction targets, there are large uncertainties concerning the other elements. To explore this uncertainty, a number of alternative policy variants has been analysed. The analysis is based on simulations with the WorldScan model, which is a global applied general equilibrium model. The macro-economic consequences in 2020 have been investigated against the background of two different growth scenarios. These scenarios closely match the scenarios developed for the so-called “Referentieraming” for the Netherlands. In none of the baseline scenarios used in this study climate policy is assumed. The benchmark policy simulation uses the GLOBAL ECONOMY scenario as a baseline. This scenario is characterised by high economic growth. Accordingly, the policy effort and associated costs to meet the 30 percent reduction of emissions compared to the 1990 level are relatively high. As an alternative, the STRONG EUROPE scenario is chosen, characterised by more moderate economic growth and environmental policies focusing on local 11 problems. In all analyses, cost-reducing options, like carbon sequestration or major breakthroughs in carbon free technologies, are not taken into account. It is too early to properly assess the effects of these options. Also the costs of structural adjustments, as well as transaction costs of emissions trading, and monopolistic power of suppliers on the international emissions market are not explicitly covered in this study. Hence, the reported cost estimates should be interpreted with caution.
