Bildungsinvestitionen: Auswirkungen auf Wirtschaftswachstum und öffentliche Finanzen

Diese Analyse der Kommission analysiert die
demographischen und institutionellen Einflüsse, die für
die öffentlichen Ausgaben im Bildungsbereich ausschlaggebend
sind. Darüber hinaus befasst sie sich mit den Auswirkungen der
Investitionen auf die durchschnittlichen Bildungsabschlüsse
und das Wirtschaftswachstum.

The rise in average attainment in the 25-64
population is projected to be slightly less than in recent decades:
in the region of 0.6 years of schooling compared to 0.8 (for the
EU-15). Nevertheless, assuming similar rates of return, education
seems set to continue making a substantial contribution to economic
growth (in the order of 0.35 percentage points of annual GDP growth
over the next decade, according to the projections, and assuming a
constant rate of return). This does not take into account the
possible contribution of a high average 

level 

of educational attainment to technical
progress (evidence on the magnitude of any such effect being more
mixed).   

The prospective contribution of education to
growth varies widely among countries (by a factor of more than 1:8
over the next decade and almost 1:6 over the next 50 years). This
is mainly because current average attainment varies widely, and
countries at the lower end of the distribution have greater scope
for increasing average attainment in future. In many cases
(exemplified by Spain), the average attainment of younger workers
is significantly higher than that of older workers, and therefore a
significant rise in average attainment is already pre-programmed.
In other countries (exemplified by Germany), the major growth
impact of rising average attainment may already have occurred;
older workers are almost as well educated as younger ones, and
therefore further increases in enrolment would be required to
generate a significant rise in average attainment. 
 

Education represents a sizeable share of
public spending and an even larger share (around one quarter) of
age-related expenditure – i.e. items on which spending as a share
of GDP is susceptible to change with the ageing of the
population.   

The pure demographic effect – a reduction in
the number of young people aged 3-24 – leads to savings in the
order of 1.0% of GDP. However, there are two offsetting effects.
First, labour force projections imply (barring an increase in youth
inactivity) that enrolment in upper-secondary and tertiary
education is set to continue increasing in most countries.
Secondly, as the size of the school-age population has fallen in
recent years, expenditure per student has risen significantly in
several countries, and this trend may well continue in the short to
medium term. Once these factors are taken into account, the results
suggest that any reductions in public education expenditure between
now and 2050 are likely to be small (in the order of 1% of GDP or
less), and that expenditure may well rise in some
countries.   

Direct projections of increased enrolment at
upper-secondary and tertiary levels, based on the continuation of
recent trends, suggest that educational expenditure in the EU may
continue to grow (by 0.7% of GDP on average between now and 2050,
and by as much as 2.4% if the trend increase in expenditure per
student continues). This of course marks a clear departure from a
‘no policy change’ scenario. Nevertheless, targets have been set at
EU level and in several Member States for increased enrolment in
upper-secondary and/or tertiary education. These are often more
ambitious than the benchmarks for increased attainment presented in
this paper. Therefore, if these targets represent serious
intentions on the part of policy-makers, then expenditure may
increase by even more. With several Member States aiming to
facilitate private investment especially in tertiary education,
however, this does not necessarily mean that public expenditure
would rise by the same amount.   

It is interesting to compare the decrease in
costs due to the demographic fall in the number of students (on
average -0.9% of GDP) with the extra costs of ‘institutional
inertia’ (on average 
0.7%
of GDP) – whereby expenditure per student does not, partly for
quite understandable reasons, decline in line with student numbers.
Although those extra costs are still lower than potential savings
due to trends in demography and enrolment policies, it is obvious
that, by limiting further increases in expenditure per student,
governments could pay for a large increase in enrolment. In
practical terms, one way to avoid the increase in expenditure per
student in this context might actually be to raise the number of
students. The true cost of raising, for example, upper-secondary
enrolment at present might be significantly lower than current
expenditure per student.   

This paper does not offer conclusions about
the case for more or less public investment in education. This
depends on the private benefits to individuals as well as the
social benefits. In countries where the projected increase in
attainment is relatively small, some observers might see the need
for investments in education to stimulate growth, but it is
impossible from the results presented to draw any conclusions about
the efficiency of such investments compared to other uses of public
funds. However, two points are worth noting. First, even in
countries where the scope for raising average attainment is
limited, there remains scope for measures to increase the quality
and efficiency of education systems. Such measures need not be
expensive. Secondly, given the substantial projected increases in
other age-related expenditure items (see: Economic Policy
Committee, 2003), there may be strong pragmatic reasons for seeking
greater private involvement in investment in education in order to
avoid under-funding.