Die Folgen eines EU-Beitritts der Türkei für die EU

Dieser von Faruk Sen in
der Turkish Policy Quarterly veröffentlichte
Aufsatz liefert einen Überblick über die Geschichte der Beziehungen
zwischen der EU und der Türkei. Er befasst sich mit den Folgen
einer möglichen EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei. Wirtschaftliche
Aspekte werden ebenfalls angesprochen und mit den wirtschaftlichen
Folgen der jüngsten EU-Erweiterungsrunde
verglichen.  

As a secular and democratic state in a less than
secure geopolitical region, Turkey has no alternative other than to
anchor itself to Europe. Relations between Europe and Turkey as
well as mutual cultural exchanges have been present at the highest
level for hundreds of years. For Europe, the Ottoman Empire used to
be a bridge to the Orient. Now it is the Turkish Republic that
plays this role. Whereas European culture received endless impulses
from Ottoman culture, especially after the fall of Constantinople
in 1453, the Turkish mind has always regarded progress as moving
towards Europe. This move was legitimized by Turkish regimes as
Western individual and social styles were defined as the most
modern forms of state and economy. The orientalist approach of
Europe, however, stressed mostly the contrasts between Turkey and
Europe, especially after the siege of Vienna. 

It must be noted that the influence of European
thinking on Turkey is in many cases underestimated. In fact, Turkey
was and is on a continuous path of integration with Europe. The
national structures of Turkey – parliamentary-representative
democracy, legal system, and administration – are, unlike other
Islamic countries, heavily influenced by European values. The will
to belong to Europe has been the determined goal of Turkish policy
since Atatürk established the state in 1923. Orientation to the
West is not just one of many options, but is rather an integral
component of the secular republic and economic
modernization. 

The relations between the European Union and
Turkey began with the Association Agreement in 1963. Further
milestones were the membership application of Turkey in 1987, the
upheavals in the international system in 1989/1990, the
introduction of the Customs Union of the EU with Turkey in 1996 and
finally the granting of candidate status by the European Council in
Helsinki in 1999. Currently the relations are in a very important
stage. At the end of 2004, the decision regarding the start of
accession negotiations with Turkey will be on agenda.

The present article provides a brief overview of
the history of Turkey-EU relations as well as the most important
consequences of an eventual Turkish accession to the EU. Within
this framework, 5 pillars will be discussed with regard to which
the impact of eventual Turkish membership might be most
influential. The economic aspect which could be decisive for
Turkey’s EU membership will also be covered, in light of the
economic impact of the recent enlargement of the EU.

Turkey as a Candidate
Country

Turkey received the official status of a
candidate country to the European Union at the Helsinki Summit in
December 1999. By opening the way for eventual membership,
candidate status has changed Turkey in a perceptible and
sustainable way. Since March 2001, which is the date when the
Turkish Cabinet finalized its National Program, substantial reforms
have been made, marking a breakthrough in fulfilling the Copenhagen
Political Criteria for membership: the abolition of capital
punishment (death penalty), approval for education to be provided
in native languages other than Turkish, as well as the approval of
Kurdish or foreign-language broadcasting stations and TV
programs.

Both the need for these reforms and the 2004
enlargement of the EU put pressure on Turkey to make progress
towards securing its own prospects for membership. With the largest
enlargement in EU history, the circumstances in Europe will change
dramatically. This is also one reason why Turkey has increased its
efforts to begin the accession negotiations as soon as possible.
Each enlargement of the EC/EU, including the Greek and the Iberian
stage (Spain and Portugal), has weakened Turkey’s prospects for
membership. The latest enlargement will most likely be an even a
bigger burden because of its financial cost to the EU. 

A further delay of the negotiation date in
December 2004 would mean that accession negotiations would begin
after the affiliation of the other candidate states, resulting in
an even further decline in the general conditions for Turkey’s
membership. With the first round of the enlargement, ten new member
states will enter the internal resources battle, leaving little
room for further net-receivers. Even if Turkey is ensured that the
new members will not have veto power regarding questions of
enlargement, this does not guarantee that the views of the old
members will remain the same after the enlargement. However, the
Copenhagen decision clearly indicated definite prospect status. It
is emphasized in paragraph 18 of the decision that Turkey is an
eligible country and should join the European Union on the basis of
the same criteria that is applied to the other candidate countries,
so debate about whether Turkey is eligible or not in terms of
cultural and geographical factors is clearly over. 

An examination of the EU’s policy regarding
Turkey reveals that its ambivalent position. On the one hand, there
exist commitments to a contract and common strategic interests. On
the other hand, there are the objective comprehensible Copenhagen
Criteria as well as emotional provisos against Turkish entry, such
as Turkey’s not being a part of the Christian Occident and its
position as a borderland between Europe and Asia. Beyond these
contradictions, one may add that there is no unity among EU member
states in terms of what the future of Europe should look like and
how its common foreign and security policy should be
established.

In this respect, the possible role of Turkey in
the Union is also undefined. The EU had not anticipated such a
quick reform process. The EU carried out a policy where it tried to
delay any decision as long as possible without discouraging Turkey
from its membership efforts. Until now, it relied on the habitual
carelessness of Turkey concerning the improvement of essential
democratic and constitutional standards as well as the standards
for human rights. With Erdogan in the government, it seems that
this policy of postponement is not possible anymore. 

Mutual Perceptions

After the realization of the tasks which Turkey
was obliged to perform with regard to the EU within the National
Action Program, Turkey confidently expected to be given a date for
the beginning of the accession negotiations. The hesitant reaction
of the EU, which was caused by a lack of implementation of the
reforms that were passed by the parliament only served to increase
the current distrust felt by Turkey and left the impression that
the EU does not act honestly and fairly. Moreover, the mention of
opening negotiations with Croatia before Turkey fueled the fires of
concern. The fact that Romania and Bulgaria are on the way to
conclude negotiations and join the EU is especially noted since in
these countries, restrictions on freedom of expression still exist
and the protection of minorities is insufficient. These were noted,
along with the persisting problems with corruption, in the
respective yearly Progress Reports. Since 1997, all twelve
countries have been categorized by the EU as states fulfilling the
Copenhagen Political Criteria. The perception that the EU treats
Turkey like a stepchild is widespread in the country. This fear,
accompanied by arguments that Turkey will not be treated fairly as
a candidate country, persists. The underlying factors suspected of
playing a role in this „unfairness“ are the geographical location
of Turkey, the security implications, the financial burden of an
eventual Turkish membership, and the export of Turkish unemployment
to the EU. 

The Five Pillars of EU-Turkey
Relations 

What impact will Turkish membership have on the
EU? The anticipated changes can be listed as five pillars; The
balance of power in EU institutions, foreign trade, the common
foreign and security policy, free movement of labor within the
Union and the structure of the resources and expenses of the EU
budget. 

Representation of Turkey in EU
Institutions

The conclusions of the Nice Summit of December
2000, and the agreed upon European Convention, which still awaits
ratification, will finalize the structure of the enlarged EU.
According to the decision made in Nice, if Turkey were a member,
Turkey would be represented with 74 sitting members (like France,
Great Britain and Italy), and have 29 votes in the EU Council
(similar to Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy). Moreover,
Turkey could send 1,000 – 1,500 bureaucrats to the European
Commission and other institutions of the EU. As population size has
gained significance with these new developments, Turkey’s power in
the Council of the EU would be even stronger. Turkey, like all the
other member states, will have the right to nominate a
commissioner. The EU constitution foresees a decline in the number
of commissioners after 2009. While it is not defined yet how this
reduction will be achieved, it is clear that no member state will
have more than one commissioner.

Customs Union

Turkish membership in the EU would not have a
negative effect on the EU. First it is the EU that profits from the
Customs Union. From 1996 onwards the active trade balance of the EU
in its foreign trade with Turkey amounted to 60 billion USD. The
Customs Union, which currently only applies to industrial goods,
has to be expanded if Turkey joins the Union to include services
and agriculture. 

Freedom of Movement 

The Association Agreement (AA) of 1964, the
Additional Protocol of 1973 and several later decisions of the
Association Council form the backbone of freedom of movement within
the EU. Originally it was determined that freedom of movement
should be introduced in stages between the end of the 12th and the
22nd consecutive year, after the AA takes effect. If Turkey is
granted full membership, many EU states fear that freedom of
movement could increase unemployment in Europe. Before the
membership of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) to the EC
these worries also existed, however these fears did not
materialize. In any case, Turkey has expressed several times its
willingness to forgo the immediate right to freedom of movement for
Turkish labor in case of membership. Ankara has proposed a
transition period following the example of Greece, Portugal, Spain
and Poland.

Effects on the EU-Budget

Calculations indicate that none of the new
members can reach the sum received by Greece, Portugal, Ireland and
Spain before 2004. The total sources transferred to Greece in 2003
was over 3 billion EUR. In relation to the population of Greece,
the amount per person is 285 EUR. When considering the sources
which are allocated to some of the new members the amount, per
person, is as follows; Poland: 79.3 EUR, Hungary: 50.6
EUR. 

If Turkey had joined the EU in May 2004, its
share would have been 90.6 EUR per person. This means that if
Turkey had become a member in 2004, it would have paid 1.951
billion EUR to the EU budget. In return, it would have received
8.129 billion EUR from the EU budget. Therefore, Turkey’s burden to
the EU budget would have been 6.177 billion EUR in 2004. This in
turn means that for every 1 EUR paid by Turkey it would receive
4.16 EUR back. In comparison to Latvia this is a difference of 0.82
EUR since for every 1 EUR paid in by Latvia it receives 4.98 EUR
back, although the population of Latvia is relatively smaller than
Turkey. 

Turkey’s contribution to the budget until the
end of 2006 would be 5.2 billion EUR. Poland’s would be 6.10
billion EUR. According to the Copenhagen financial framework
including the period 2004-2006, the amount of resources that will
be transferred to Poland will amount to 19.2 billion EUR. 

The total cost of enlargement for the period
2004-2006 will be 39.13 billion EUR and the amount that will be
paid by the EU 10 will be 14.76 billion EUR. Hence, this means that
the net cost of the ten new members for the EU is 24.37 billion
EUR. If Turkey had joined with the ten new countries, Turkey would
have received 31.75 billion EUR. Hence Turkey’s burden to the
budget in the period 2004-2006 would be 26.5 billion EUR.

The numbers above are based on the fact that the
structural and agricultural funds will not change between 2004-2006
and that the high payment to the ten member states will continue.
In addition, the calculation considers the worst-case scenario with
regard to Turkey’s economic development. Therefore, the cost of
Turkey’s membership should be even less than the figures mentioned
above. 

The European Security and Defense
Policy 

The significance of Turkey as a bridge between
Europe and Asia due to its strategically important location can
hardly be overestimated. However, the rise of two opposite
tendencies are being observed in recent years: On the one hand,
with the end of the Cold War, the political and strategic
significance of Turkey as a bulwark against a communist expansion
decreased. On the other hand Turkey has emerged as a regional power
in the Eastern Mediterranean and its importance has increased. In
order to realize the European Common Foreign and Security policy
(CFSP) and for the EU to maintain the security of its adjourning
regions, Turkey’s membership is indispensable. The development of a
common European security policy would definitely be facilitated if
Turkey did not sit between the „transatlantic chairs as a
NATO-member without EU affiliation, Turkey’s integration to the EU
would primarily mean a fortification of the European position in
the transatlantic pact. Also Turkey, as the only secular and
democratic Islamic country in the region, can contribute to the
conflict against international terrorism.

Turkey is one of the guarantors of the stability
of the Black Sea region, balances Russia in the Caucasus, controls
the strategically important connection from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean, and is still the pillar of NATO’s south east defense
system. Ultimately the countries surrounding Turkey supply 60
percent of the natural gas and petroleum demand of Europe. The
importance of Turkey, with regard to security and defense policy,
has been apparent in several crisis situations such as the
September 11 attacks and the Iraq war. In consideration of the new
political objective and the security concerns of the EU, Turkey is
vital in terms of providing stability in the regions of the
Eastern-Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey’s
role as a bridge to the Islamic World is also noteworthy.

Conclusion

Analysis of the impact of an eventual Turkish
membership demonstrates that the consequences for the EU would be
less aggravating than often assumed. Furthermore, the issues which
are problematic will effect the EU even if Turkey is not an EU
member. The developments of the internal structures of the EU will
determine much of Turkey’s impact on the Union. The question of
subventions and economic resources to be provided to new members
could be especially decisive in Turkey’s membership prospects.
However, it is apparent that the changes in EU policies and
structures, as well as changes taking place in Turkey need not to
be factored into any analysis. The neglect of these dynamics will
lead to miscalculations. 

This article was originally published in
the Turkish
Policy Quarterly.

Faruk Sen is Professor at the
Center for Studies on Turkey, Germany.