Türkei: Brücke oder Brückenkopf?

In diesem Artikel stellt Stanley
Cossick  die Frage, ob der EU-Beitritt der Türkei
eine ‚Brücke des Verständnisses‘ zwischen Westeuropa und der
islamischen Welt herstellen würde oder ob die
Türkei einer großen Zahl von Moslems, die in westliche
Gesellschaften ‚eindringen‘ wollen,  als Ausgangsbasis
dienen würde. Der Artikel, der in Turkish Policy
Quarterly veröffentlicht wurde, untersucht die
wichtigsten nicht-wirtschaftlichen Fragen und insbesondere die
Rolle von Religion. Der Autor vertritt die Auffassung, dass
alle Länder, die die politischen und wirtschaftlichen
Kriterien für die EU-Mitgliedschaft erfüllen, prinzipiell
aufgenommen werden sollten. Es sei allerdings ein Grund zur Sorge,
dass die EU selbst nicht ausreichend auf weitere
Erweiterungsrunden vorbereitet sei. Der Europäische
Rat beschreibt, auf welcher Grundlage der Europäische Rat die
Verhandlungen Ende 2004 aufnehmen sollte und betont, dass die
Erfüllung der politischen Kriterien eine Voraussetzung für den
Beitritt, nicht aber für die Einleitung von Verhandlungen, sein
sollte.

This title is unapologetically provocative.
Problems are not solved by burying them in the sand or by avoiding
discussing them on the grounds of political incorrectness. Would
Turkey’s accession to the European Union create a bridge of
understanding between Western Europe and the Islamic world or would
Turkey be a bridgehead from which large numbers of Muslims will
„invade“ western society? That is what I believe to be the question
on many lips: it deserves addressing directly. 

Many objections to Turkish membership of the
Union are heard, some based on genuine and others on spurious
concerns. Some objections are rational, others emotive. In a
nutshell, as encapsulated by Giscard d’Estaing, many fear that the
admission of a country of 70 million predominantly Muslim
inhabitants, from a land space substantially in Asia, weakened by a
long period of authoritarian governments, and with a substantially
lower standard of living than the EU average, would drastically
weaken European integration and its Christian foundations. Genuine
concerns also center round the financial cost of absorbing such a
large and poor country as well as the influence it might wield.
Turkey’s GDP is 27 percent of the EU average, with its economy 2
percent of EU GDP. 

Assessing the risks and opportunities involved
in Turkish membership is made particularly difficult because they
will depend upon the circumstances prevailing both in the Union and
in Turkey in the middle of the next decade. By that time, the EU
will probably have been further enlarged by the accession of
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Hopefully, there will have been
considerable further integration in the internal market (especially
services), foreign and security policy, and justice and home
affairs cooperation. Expenditure on agricultural price support and
on regional funds should have drastically diminished. 

A Personal View

I believe that all countries which qualify
politically and economically for membership of the European Union
should be admitted. However, I am deeply concerned that the EU
itself is not sufficiently prepared. The new Constitutional Treaty
should have been adopted at least in 2000 and not delayed until
2004. Ratification by the 25 Member States is not guaranteed and,
if the new Treaty does not come into force, the Union will not be
able to operate efficiently with its existing 25 members, let alone
with additional members. The new Treaty contains only the very
minimum reforms necessary, and the fact that all future Treaty
amendments will require unanimity and ratification suggests that no
further improvements can be made.

This makes me very hesitant about the current
scenario of admitting Bulgaria and Romania by 2007, followed by
Croatia, Macedonia and no doubt other Balkan States. Above all, is
the concerns raised by the Turkish application.

The EU’s recognition of the ultimate aim of
Turkish membership was acknowledged in the Association Agreement
signed in 1963. The Union has continued to confirm its commitment,
subject to the necessary qualifying criteria, and relying upon
this, Turkey has made tremendous efforts to implement the necessary
political, legal and economic reforms. It would therefore be
immoral for the European Council in December to refuse to open
negotiations if the Commission’s Recommendation is
favorable. 

It might have been reasonable to argue that
there should be no further accession until there has been
sufficient EU consolidation. Phased accession via a European
Economic Area-type arrangement would have made much more sense, but
that solution is no longer politically acceptable.

Were we to break our promises to the Turkish
government, we would be seriously letting it down and risking the
destabilization of Turkey. Put bluntly, the problems inherent in
Turkish entry are less than the problems that a rejection would be
likely to trigger. 

Commission’s Recommendation

The report and recommendation concerning Turkey
could be one of the most important decisions the Commission has
ever taken. The accession of Turkey would have greater
geopolitical, institutional, financial, economic, social and
cultural impact than any previous enlargement. The decision will
fall to the present Commission in October 2004, during the last
month of its mandate. 

This article focuses on the geopolitical, social
and cultural impact of Turkish accession. The institutional,
financial and economic aspects should not be underestimated; but
the Commission is well qualified to address these. 

The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993
stated that:

Accession will take place as soon as an
associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership
by satisfying the economic and political conditions
required.  

Membership requires that the candidate
country must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure
and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the
candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership
including adherence to the aims of political, economic &
monetary union. 

These criteria must be fulfilled, according to
the Copenhagen Council decision, by the date of
accession. However, successive European Council meetings (the
last being in Brussels in June 2004) confirmed that, in Turkey’s
case, the Copenhagen political criteria must be
met before  accession negotiations are opened.
This is somewhat surprising and does not appear to have provoked
any comment. If not all the Copenhagen criteria have been
satisfied, but sufficient progress appears to have been made to
accept that within the approximately 10 year negotiating period the
criteria will be satisfied, then negotiations should be opened.
This does not commit the Union to admit Turkey unless the political
criteria are met at the time of entry. However, this is not what
the European Council apparently decided. 

Reference to the US State Department’s 2003
report on human rights practices in Turkey reveals many ongoing
problems: particularly unlawful killing and torture and other human
rights abuses, and discrimination against women. Thus, it would be
critical, for example, that non-Muslim minorities in Turkey enjoy
full rights before negotiations are opened; not just that serious
progress has been made and the government knows that these
minorities have to be given equal treatment before EU
accession. 

Michael Emerson, a strong advocate of Turkish
accession, acknowledged, in a CEPS Policy Brief of April 2004, that
Turkey needed to take at least 20 drastic actions if the European
Council is to decide in December to open negotiations. 

It is to be hoped that the Commission will
express a clear view that political tests should be preconditions
to actual accession, and not to opening negotiations, and that
Turkey should not be treated differently from other candidate
countries. 

Social Integration

There are two aspects of the Turkish social
environment which need addressing. First, gender equality. In the
southern and eastern regions, a substantial proportion of girls do
not go to school. Perhaps less than half of Turkish women work,
compared with the EU. Other forms of sexual inequality exist,
including ‘honor killings,’ forced marriages and dress
restrictions. 

In the employment field, there is no ‘social
dialogue’ and employer-employee relations are more akin in nature
to Turkey’s geographical location, which is mostly outside
Europe. 

The Union prides itself on its diversity but
seeks „unity through diversity.“ A broadly defined common identity
is relevant and European integration has always been underpinned by
solidarity. An extra effort will be required, given the huge
societal differences between the EU 25 and Turkey, and indeed the
huge societal differences within the country. 

Relevance of Religion

Strictly speaking, religion qua religion is
irrelevant to Turkey’s accession. Everyone in the EU has the right
to freedom of religion (codified in Article II-10 of the
Constitutional Treaty). However, the issue of religion cannot be
dismissed out of hand for two reasons. First, it is linked to
culture. Second, although Turkey is a secular state with legal
freedom of religion, in practice Islam has a dominant influence on
its society and religious minorities encounter
difficulties. 

The Islamic world is not in any way monolithic,
but composed of a range of beliefs: Sunni, Shi’ite, Wahabi… Talk
about a ‘Muslim Community’ is wide of the mark. Moslems share some
fundamental faith but there are numerous combinations of sect,
country, race, culture and language. 

The gulf of understanding between Europeans and
those who live in the Greater Middle East region is widening. In
particular, we Europeans are struggling to comprehend the nature,
relevance and context of Islamic fundamentalism today. An
examination of the historic growth of fundamentalism is a necessary
starting point. Karen Armstrong painstakingly explains the roots
and growth of religious fundamentalism, exploding the myth that it
is peculiarly Moslem. 

Some of us in the West have a tendency to move
simplistically along the path: Islamism-fundamentalism-terrorism.
This is an absurd but nevertheless dangerous perception which must
be eliminated. Fundamentalism did not begin in the Islamic world:
it is a comparatively recent phenomenon, manifesting itself first
in the American South, then in the Jewish Diaspora and only then in
the Islamic world. At least two wars are being fought in the Middle
East. One is the Arab-Israeli conflict; the other is a war within
such individual countries as Israel and Egypt, between secularists
and religious. This battle is not, however, confined to the Middle
East. 

There is an assumption that Islam and the West
are incompatible, their ideas utterly opposed and that Islam is at
odds with everything that the West stands for. Karen Armstrong
rejects this thesis. Under the impetus of their own spirituality
Muslims arrived at many ideas and values that are similar to our
own modern notions. They had evolved an appreciation of the wisdom
of separating religion and politics and a vision of the
intellectual freedom of the individual, and seen the necessity for
the cultivation of rational thought. The Koranic passion for
justice and equity is equally sacred in the modern Western
ethos. 

Religion Versus
Secularism 

The battle between religion and secularism was
increasing at the end of the 19th century, by which time there were
Jews, Christians, and Muslims who believed that their faith was in
danger of being obliterated. US religious conservatism grew
substantially during the first quarter of the 20th century. There
had been no need for southerners to become fundamentalists as they
were much more conservative, but they were worried about the
teaching of evolution in the public schools. Around the same time,
Jewish traditionalists began to realize that the thrust of secular
modernity was diametrically opposed to the rhythms of conservative
pre-modern religion, and that it threatened essential
views. 

Later Muslims saw secularism – and western
modernity – as an attempt to destroy Islam. When later Muslim
fundamentalists claimed that secularization meant the destruction
of Islam, they would often point to the example of Atatürk.

Rise of Islamic
Fundamentalism

Muslims had, up to 1960, produced no
fundamentalist movement because their modernization process was not
yet sufficiently advanced. However, due to their experiences in
Egypt, Palestine, Iran and elsewhere, there was a religious revival
throughout the Middle East, and a significant number of Muslims
became convinced that religious people and secularists could not
live at peace in the same society. 

Parallel with these developments, a new form of
Jewish fundamentalism in Israel had already started to translate
myth into hard political fact and there was a similar readiness
among Protestant fundamentalists in the United States. 

Fundamentalist fury reminds us that our modern
culture imposes extremely difficult demands on human beings.
Frequently, society has become divided into two nations: the
secularists and religious living in the same country cannot speak
one another’s language or see things from the same point of view.
Suppression and coercion are clearly not the answer. They
invariably lead to a backlash and encourage extremism. And yet,
attempting to exploit fundamentalism for secular, pragmatic ends is
also counter-productive. 

It is important to recognize that these
theologies and ideologies are rooted in fear. These movements are
not necessarily an archaic throwback to the past; they can be
modern, innovative and modernizing. Religion has often helped
people to adjust to modernity. 

If fundamentalists must evolve a more
compassionate assessment of their enemies in order to be true to
their religious traditions, secularists must also be more faithful
to the benevolence, tolerance, and respect for humanity which
characterizes modern cultures at their best, and address themselves
more empathetically to the fears, anxieties and needs which so many
of their fundamentalist neighbors experience and which no society
can safely ignore. Above all, we must distinguish between the
teachings of religion itself and those religious leaders who
through their teachings distort religion and manipulate its
adherents.

An understanding of the nature, relevance and
context of Islamic fundamentalism today – through looking at the
historical growth of religious fundamentalism in general – is
necessary in defining and applying European policy both towards the
Middle East and international terrorism. It will at the very least
increase our sensitivity in addressing the Middle East, and
hopefully dissuade us from thoughtlessly moving automatically down
the path from Islamism to fundamentalism to terrorism. 

So we have seen that the divide between religion
and secularism exists within – rather than between – societies
dominated by the three main monotheistic religions. This battle is
being played out currently in several European countries,
particularly in France and Turkey. 

The Clash of Civilizations

The question must now be addressed as to whether
mainstream Islam can cohabit comfortably with Christianity (and
indeed Judaism) inside the European Union. This brings us to
Huntington’s thesis of ten years or so ago, according to which the
west won the world, not by the superiority of its ideas or values
or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were
converted), but rather by its superiority in applying organized
violence.

Modernization does not necessarily mean
westernization. Non-western societies can modernize and have
modernized without abandoning their own cultures and adopting
wholesale western values, institutions, and practices. Like other
manifestations of the global religious revival, the Islamic
resurgence is both a product of and an effort to come to grips with
modernization. Non-westerners also do not hesitate to point to the
gaps between western principle and western action. Hypocrisy and
double standards are the price of universalist pretensions.
Democracy is promoted but not if its brings Islamic fundamentalists
to power, such as in Algeria; non-proliferation is preached for
North Korea and Iran but not for Israel; free trade is the elixir
of economic growth but not for agriculture; human rights are an
issue with China but only recently with Saudi Arabia; aggression
against oil-owning Kuwaitis is massively repulsed but not against
non-oil-owning Bosnians. 

Muslim leaders stress the differences between
their civilization and western civilization, the superiority of
their culture, and the need to maintain the integrity of that
culture against western onslaught. Muslims fear and resent western
power and the threat which this poses to their society and beliefs.
They see western (secularist) culture as materialistic, arrogant,
corrupt, decadent, irreligious and immoral. These images of the
west are held not only by fundamentalist imams but also by those
whom many in the west would consider their natural allies and
supporters.

The underlying problem for the west is not
Islamic fundamentalism but whether a good part of the Islamic world
believes Islam to be a different civilization whose people are
convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with
the inferiority of their power. What the west sees as a victory for
the free world, Muslims see as a victory for Islam. The first Gulf
War became a civilization war because the west intervened
militarily in a Muslim conflict, westerners overwhelmingly
supported that intervention, and Muslims throughout the world came
to see that intervention as a war against them and rallied against
what they saw as one more instance of western imperialism. And much
more so with the second Gulf War. 

The global mono-culturalists want to make the
world like America. The domestic multiculturalists want to make
America like the world. In a multi-civilization world, the
constructive course is to renounce universalism, accept diversity,
and seek commonalities.

Behind all this agonizing is the possible
awareness that Muslims represent about 20 percent of the world’s
population, rising to about 30 percent by 2005 and passing the
number of Christians.

Europeans claim that cultural diversity is
central to their civilization and they espouse international
multilateralism. Religious diversity is now accepted, albeit
comparatively recently in practice and subject to exceptions. Islam
as a minority religion in a community is not a western religion;
and it governs – or to westerners, intrudes on -everyday life to a
much greater extent than Christianity or Judaism (except as
practiced by the ultra-religious). However, these are not grounds
for rejecting Turkish membership. 

Immigration

EU citizens understandably fear heavy
immigration by Turks into the Union after enlargement. This concern
has preceded previous enlargements, but it is particularly strong
in the case of Turkey because of the size of its population and its
poorness. A long transition period is likely by which time the
economic gap should be less and the demography of existing Member
States might lead to Turkish, rather than North African or Asian
immigrants being more welcome. 

However, EU public opinion fears the possibility
of such immigration because of the problems immigration are causing
individual Member States, including the threat (or perceived
threat) to employment and often the high incidence of crime
associated with immigration. This wrongly confuses the question of
Turkey’s admission into the Union with the failed immigration
policies of the Member States. 

Historically, the United States has been much
more successful in integrating its immigrants (of varying
backgrounds). A Pole living in Chicago is both comfortable with his
own ethical background and comfortable waving the ‘Star-spangled
Banner’ as a sign of a patriotic American. On the whole, little
similar reconciliation of interests has taken place in
Europe. 

The problem is particularly acute with the
European Union’s Muslim population, variously estimated between
nine and 15 million. As has already been stated, there is no
unified Muslim society in Europe, but at the same time there is
also no common European understanding and policy towards Europe’s
Muslim citizens. Muslim immigrants appear to be far less successful
in Europe than non-Muslims, particularly Chinese and Indians. 80
percent of British Muslims live in households with incomes below
the national average compared to 25 percent of non-Muslim
households.

Islam tends also to be seen as a threat and this
is not only since 9/11. Muslims are so often perceived as
terrorists. Muslims have, since the 1978-9 Iranian Revolution and
the oil crisis, been viewed with suspicion. The ‘clash of
civilizations’ is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, fuelled by
Islamic fury over Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, western disgust
with the resulting fatwa and other such incidents. And, of course,
Islam is the third largest faith practiced in Europe and the
fastest growing religion in the world, both through birth and
conversion. 

Finally, there is a fundamental disagreement
between the majority of Europeans who do not accept that Muslims
share their basic modern, democratic values, and western Muslims,
who believe that these are prejudices depriving them of their
rights. 

This treatment of Muslims as a threat has
clearly contributed to the increase in hostile stability of
attitudes towards Muslims, particularly since 9/11. This is also
fuelling the anti-immigration sentiments to be found in many parts
of the Union. 

Bridge or Bridgehead?

Against this disturbing background, we have to
determine whether Turkey’s accession to the European Union will
create a bridge of understanding between Western Europe and the
Islamic world or a bridgehead from which large numbers of Muslims
will „invade“ Western society. 

As previously indicated, there are today well
over 10 million Muslims residing in EU countries. There are nearly
four million Turks living in the Union. Turkish migration goes back
for more than 40 years and a considerable degree of integration has
been achieved. Over 80.000 Turks run their own businesses employing
over 290.000 people and they have contributed more than EUR 17
million to the EU’s economy. The Turkish population in EU has an
economic power 16 times that of Malta, 10 times that of Estonia and
eight times that of Lithuania. The economic power of the Turks
living in Europe is greater than that of eight of the newest
members.

According to European Commissioner, Günter
Verheugen, „Turkey could be a model for the region and Islamic
countries. It could regulate the relations between the EU and the
Islamic world. It could carry the supremacy of laws and universal
values to those regions.“ 

Prime Minister Erdogan said that „We do not
consider the EU a Christian club. On the contrary, we describe it
as a whole of political values in which civilizations meet each
other.“

Turkey’s geopolitical position is critically
important, linking Europe with the Balkans, the Middle East and
Central Asia. Turkey therefore sits at the crossroads of important
energy, transportation and community networks. 

Conclusion

The Commission may well conclude that, although
serious progress has been made, the Copenhagen political criteria
will not have been fully satisfied by the end of 2004. It is to be
hoped, therefore, that an opinion will be expressed as to whether
the criteria are likely to be satisfied before negotiations are
concluded. If the answer is in the affirmative, the European
Council, notwithstanding its previous utterances, should open
negotiations but make clear that:

– the criteria have not yet been satisfied;

– considerable progress has been made;

– there is every reason to believe that they
will be satisfied by the conclusion of the negotiations; but

– accession will not be possible without all the
political criteria being fulfilled. 

There should be no concealment of the fact that
accession is unlikely before at least 2015 and a clear statement
that the issue of religion is irrelevant.

And this is the very point. Once Turkey has
achieved in practice institutional stability guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities, the issue of religion becomes irrelevant.
However, it will require a tremendous effort on Turkey’s part,
because compliance has to be achieved, not only in Istanbul but
also in south-east Anatolia. 

Once there is an affirmative EU decision to open
negotiations, the focus should then be on the opportunities that
this brings. An open attitude is the only way to ensure that
Turkey’s accession will not be a bridgehead but a bridge, with
Turkey fully integrating into the Union. It will be incumbent on EU
leaders, however, to explain fully their actions and the
consequences. 

As Franklin D Roosevelt memorably said, „We
have nothing to fear but fear itself.“

 

This article was originally published in
the Turkish
Policy Quarterly.

Stanley Crossick is founding Chairman of the
European Policy Centre, Brussels.