Kosovo : Le défi de la transition

Le principal défi lié à l’actuel processus de détermination du statut final de la province est de parvenir à constituer un Kosovo doté des plus grandes chances de stabilité et de développement. Selon cet article publié par l’International Crisis Group, alors qu’en théorie un accord entre Belgrade et Pristina reste souhaitable, il est extrêmement peu probable qu’un gouvernement serbe accepte de façon volontaire le type d’indépendance du Kosovo, qu’elle soit conditionnelle ou limitée, qui est nécessaire à une solution stable sur le long terme.

The international community, and in particular the UN Special Envoy charged with resolving the status process, Martti Ahtisaari, must accordingly prepare for the possibility of imposing an independence package for Kosovo, however diplomatically painful that may be in the short term, rather than hoping to finesse Pristina and Belgrade’s differences with an ambiguous solution, or one in which key elements are deferred. 

None of this removes any responsibility from Kosovo’s Albanian majority. They must offer packages of rights for Kosovo’s Serb and other minorities in at least three areas: central institutions, decentralisation and religious and cultural heritage. Details of inclusion and representation in core governing institutions, with arrangements for involvement of the relevant mother country in fields such as culture, education and possibly more, should be negotiated with not only Kosovo’s Serb minority but also its Turks, Bosnians and others. An agreement on decentralisation, to be brokered in the first instance by Ahtisaari and his team, could then be implemented under international oversight for three years, as was done with the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia. Pristina’s negotiators should also immediately start direct negotiation with the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo on a package of protection arrangements for it and its sites. Only once this groundwork has been done should the Contact Group be prepared to make concerted, formal moves toward recognising Kosovo’s independence.

The independence package the international community settles upon Kosovo should prioritise its social and economic development. Crafting it should be an opportunity for the European Union and its member states in particular to expand their commitment, including resources, to the Western Balkans generally. A generous education assistance program and visa liberalisation are needed, as is assistance for rural development. The EU must not end up spending more on its own post-status mission costs in Kosovo than it does on pre-accession structural funds for the new country. 

While a new UN Security Council resolution will be vital to set Kosovo on a course of independence from Serbia, any new international mission there should desirably be based on agreement with the new state, preferably founded in its constitution. This international presence should have fewer powers than the High Representative has enjoyed in Bosnia. EU institutions properly emphasise that they want a Kosovo which can be treated in most respects as a normal country, with politicians answerable to their own electorates. But there is one area where the international community should consider a more intrusive mission: northern Kosovo, and Mitrovica in particular, where Serb parallel structures defy UNMIK and the provisional government (PISG) alike. Leaving a new Kosovo government to try to incorporate the north would invite a violent breakdown. A transitional international authority there is the only sensible answer.

To read the article in full, visit the International Crisis Group website.