L'Ukraine et l'UE après la Révolution orange

Le résultat des élections présidentielles ukrainiennes demeure
toujours très incertain.  Cet article, publié par
le Centre for European Policy
Studies, recommande aux responsables
européens d’adopter une approche en trois temps dans le cadre
de leurs relations futures avec l’Ukraine.

First, the EU needs to develop strategies to support the
democratic transmission of power from President Leonid Kuchma to
his successor. In the event of violence being instigated by the
authorities, it is suggested that the EU immediately suspend all
contacts with the Ukrainian leadership. If the Supreme Court finds
that the result cannot be said to reflect the will of the Ukrainian
people, new elections run by the OSCE should be
considered. 

Second, a strategy needs to be formulated to deal with the
consequences of a victory for Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. It
would be imperative that the EU resists the temptation to disengage
with Ukraine. The EU would nevertheless need to radically change
its policy, for instance by re-targeting economic aid and
minimising political dialogue. 

Third, a strategy needs to be formulated in the event that
Viktor Yushchenko wins the presidency. In this case, the EU and
Ukraine should in the short-term renegotiate the Action Plan to
strengthen bilateral relations. Faced with a pro-European, credible
reformist like Mr Yushchenko, with broad domestic support, the EU
would in the longer term find it difficult to continue to avoid the
question of Ukraine as a potential member of the EU.

Introduction 

The outcome of the disputed presidential elections in Ukraine is
still uncertain. It is however clear that the Orange Revolution of
November 2004 will have profound consequences for Europe and the
EU’s relationship with Ukraine. Since the second round of
presidential elections on 21 November, the Ukrainian people have
shown the strength of their desire for Ukraine to be a pluralistic
democracy. It is therefore essential that Europe responds with
equal determination to support the aspirations of the Ukrainian
electorate. 

It is abundantly clear that the elections were falsified by the
Ukrainian authorities. This view is now endorsed by a number of
bodies ranging from the Ukrainian parliament, to the EU, EU member
states, the OSCE and the US, all of which have refused to recognise
Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych as the president of Ukraine. In
contrast, Russia has done so. 

The next stage in the ensuing turmoil in Ukraine is unclear, as
from a legal point of view, Ukraine has fallen into a political
vacuum. It is apparent that the struggle between the Ukrainian
authorities and the opposition is not over. 

Owing to proclamations made by senior political figures in the
eastern and southern regions of Ukraine for regional autonomy, the
spectre of secession has arisen in Ukraine, with its potential
disintegration into what observers (in the EU and US) have referred
to as a ‘West and East’. It needs to be emphasised that this is an
oversimplification. The issue of separation is limited to the
south-eastern regions of Ukraine, namely Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts, where Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych has his power base.
With a combined population of more than 7 million, or 15% of
Ukraine’s total population, these two regions contain much of
Ukraine’s natural resources. They are also the home to important
industries such as steel and mining that have played a crucial role
in the recent economic upturn in Ukraine. While these moves towards
greater regional autonomy are significant, as things stand the
likelihood of them leading to secession is exaggerated. The
disintegration of Ukraine is improbable. 

A victory for the opposition in any subsequent rounds is a
likely outcome, although far from certain; a victory for the
current authorities is still possible. Either way, the EU will need
to develop a clear strategy on Ukraine for the immediate future and
the coming months and years. 

Three strategies are needed: 

First, the EU needs to develop approaches to support
the democratic transmission of power from President Kuchma to his
successor (immediate strategy). 

Second, a strategy needs to be formulated to deal with
the consequences of a victory for Mr Yanukovych (or that of any
other person representing the current authorities) (medium-term
strategy). 

Third, a strategy needs to be formulated in the event
of Mr Viktor Yushchenko winning the presidency (medium- and
long-term strategy). 

To read the article in full, visit the Centre for European Policy Studies website.