Russland: Auswirkungen des Rücktritts vom Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte

Russlands Rücktritt von seiner Teilnahme vom Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa hat einige Fragen ausgeworfen in Hinblick darauf, wann ein Staat seine Vertragsverpflichtungen aussetzen kann sowie die rechtlichen Konsequenzen eines solches Schritts. Dies schreibt Duncan B. Hollis in einem Artikel für Juli 2007 für American Society of International Law (ASIL).

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a federal decree of suspension on July 14. The CFE Treaty, dating from 1990, is an arms control agreement establishing parity and a reduction of forces between NATO members and former Warsaw Pact countries, remarks the author. 

It was amended in 1999 to reflect the „shifting strategic environment“, adds Hollis – although the subsequent Adaptation Agreement has yet to come into force as NATO members have delayed their ratifications pending Russian compliance with certain international commitments. 

For ASIL, discussion of the issue focuses on whether Russia is suspending participation due to other countries‘ failure to ratify the Adaptation Agreement, or as a response to NATO efforts to install missile shields in Poland and the Czech Republic. 

Hollis questions whether Russia has the legal right to withdraw from the CFE Treaty in such instances, stating that „it is uncertain whether a right to suspend can derive from or be equated with a right to withdraw or terminate a treaty“, and suggesting that it would have difficulty to legally justify doing so using the content of the treaty itself. 

Hollis points out that none of the other parties in the CFE have challenged Russia’s right to suspend its treaty obligations, with the US and NATO opting thus far to express their „disappointment“ instead. If they do challenge it, then Russia will need to articulate one of the alternative legal bases for suspension available, he believes – other than invoking the treaty text. 

Hollis claims that even if Russia establishes a legal basis for suspension, the legal implications of this are unclear as suspension of the treaty is an unprecedented step. He believes that Russia’s actions provide „a useful opportunity“ to explore the consequences of suspension more precisely. 

Hollis wonders why Russia did not simply withdraw from the treaty rather than suspending participation. He concludes that international politics may be one explanation, in that Russia may have wanted to show its displeasure with the slow pace of ratification of the Adaptation Agreement. Another explanation is the requirements of domestic law in Russia, which only give the President legal authority to suspend treaties – to terminate them, he requires the agreement of the Duma.