Analyse : Changement climatique post-2012 – Consensus et désaccords transatlantiques

Benito Müller (Institut d’Oxford pour les études énergétiques) présente un échange de points de vue entre des experts américains et européens dans le domaine de l’énvironnement sur les défis relatifs à la mise en oeuvre du protocole de Kyoto.

Ian Purvis (Brookings Institute, Washington DC), Michael Grubb (Imperial College London and UK Carbon Trust) and Michael Zammit Cutajar (former Executive Secretary of the United Framework Convention on Climate Change) aired their views on the transatlantic context of the Kyoto Protocol in a special issue (2004) of the International Review for Environmental Strategies. This paper summarizes their main points of agreement and contention.

The analysis starts with the common European vision of the « paradoxical » US position on Kyoto – a treaty that has a clear US imprint (recourse to the market in order to achieve environmental objectives), but which is precisely rejected by the same country.

This lack of American commitment is unanimously attributed to « UN scepticism, » that is, a well-known reluctance to multilateralism that bypasses the mere environmental realm. 

« Competitiveness and cost concerns » stand for the second explanation for the American rejection of Kyoto. This refers to the widespread belief, echoed by President Bush, that the Protocol would exempt from compliance « 80 percent of the world, including […] China and India, [which] would cause serious harm to the US economy. » Both European experts warn against the overexploitation of this argument to disguise the traditional reservations to multilateral approaches cited above.

Thinking about possible ways out of the US veto on Kyoto, the three authors agree on the fact that domestic action must precede any new international treaty. However, their recommendations on the way forward differ dramatically. N. Purvis (US) advocates a « non-UN and non-treaty based approach, » whereby the US would explore solutions on a bilateral basis with partners such as Japan and Europe – thus feeling peer pressure to act against climate change. 

On the contrary, the Europeans refuse to « tinker with international design, » and they argue for a broad continuation of the Kyoto cap and trade regime for all industrialised countries. New terms of engagement with the US, mainly driven by growing domestic forces, should be set up. In this perspective, they support the idea of admitting willing non-Parties or willing sub-national actors of non-Parties to participate in the treaty’s flexibility mechanisms – on the model of the EC Linking Directive for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 

Another pernicious issue (and maybe the « trickiest one ») in which the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol remains rooted, is the evolution of large developing country emitters. These latter are unanimously described as « unwilling to make substantive climate commitments even though they are the most vulnerable to global change. » While the American expert concludes that « the USA should soften its demands » on developing countries, M. Grubb calls for « action in and by » these nations. The precision is crucial, since it distinguishes between 1) whose emissions ought to be addressed – a matter of environmental relevance – and 2) who ought to carry the burden of taking the appropriate actions (a matter of equity). To resolve this unfair competitiveness problem, costly mitigation commitments are dismissed in favour of alternative remedies such as: preferential agreements, export credit facilities or the clean development mechanism.