Analyse : Monténégro - La zone grise

Sans résultat net au référendum sur son indépendance, les relations du Monténégro avec la Serbie – et avec l’UE – pourraient paradoxalement mieux fonctionner, indique cet article dans Transitions Online.

In theory, there is little cause for concern over Montenegro’s referendum on independence next weekend. The European Union, which played a key role in creating a loose State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, has laid clear ground rules that all key protagonists have accepted, though some rather grudgingly.

Most crucially, the voting on 21 May must pass two markers if the measure is to pass: At least 50 percent of registered voters must participate, and 55 percent of those votes must be in favor of independence. This sounds simple enough and even foolproof given the loudly and frequently expressed commitments by the pro- and anti-independence camps in Montenegro to the process of EU integration. 

Fortunately, and despite many dirty tricks and spontaneous fistfights and even shooting featured in the campaign so far, neither side seems intent on resorting to organized violence, though more cautious observers don’t rule it out completely. While this perhaps illustrates the maturity of Montenegro’s democracy, the tiny republic is supposed to be way past such basic achievements by now. 

One would assume that the threat of serious internal violence was removed back in 2000 with the fall of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, the regime which had provided support to the more aggressive elements among Montenegro’s pro-Serbian opposition. Wasn’t Montenegro meant to be moving toward becoming a more cohesive society capable of overcoming its internal divisions? If so, it has not progressed very far on that path and the forthcoming referendum will not necessarily push it much further.

Not only black or white

While only a very decisive result either way is likely to settle the matter of Montenegro’s status, though perhaps not once and for all, such a result looks unlikely. In fact, a result falling into what is now often called the “gray zone” – showing a pro-independence majority, but one short of the required 55 percent – looks rather more likely, according to polls.

While both sides claim to be confident in the victory of their own cause, it is clear that both camps are preparing to deal with the consequences of a gray zone result. 

The pro-union camp and their supporters in Belgrade argue that such a result would simply close the matter and ensure the survival of the state union, even though it is blatantly obvious that a union rejected by a majority, no matter how tiny, will stand a very slim chance of becoming stable and meaningful. 

Officials of Montenegro’s pro-independence government have suggested that a victory short of the required 55 percent would still be a victory for their cause, even though the terms of the special law under which the referendum is taking place clearly state that this would be a defeat, and one which the pro-union bloc would certainly seize upon.

The EU, which more or less imposed that law on the government, seems also focused on the gray zone, even though the union’s special envoy for Montenegro’s referendum, Miroslav Lajcak, has repeatedly stressed the law makes no reference to such an outcome. Lajcak has also said, though, that a majority for independence short of 55 percent would mean fresh negotiations between Podgorica and Belgrade on redefining the current state union. 

But how would they go about redefining this curious entity made of two states grossly disparate in size, which already conduct nearly all of their affairs independently of each other, but whose citizens still serve one army and enjoy all rights regardless of their place of residence? Presumably the EU would again mediate and propose solutions. Making it a closer union than it is at the moment would not fly with the pro-independence bloc and might not thrill too many people in Serbia either. On the other hand, it would take some imagination to turn the union into an even looser joint state; and even if this were possible, it would not really satisfy anyone and would therefore make no sense.

In other words, unless on 21 May 55 percent or more voters support independence or more than 50 percent vote against, an even more unlikely outcome, Montenegro’s future will look a fair bit more complicated than it should be. But even if the result is black or white rather than gray, it will still be true that all sides, including the EU, have engaged in a high-risk strategy.

To read the article in full, visit the Transitions Online website.