Pourquoi l'UE doit admettre la Turquie en son sein

Pour Ankara, le processus d’adhésion à l’Union européenne s’annonce long et difficile. Parmi les principaux obstacles figurent : l’opposition d’une majorité de l’opinion publique européenne à l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’Union, les difficultés rencontrées par l’UE pour digérer son précédent élargissement, ou bien encore la question chypriote. Les différents articles publiés dans cette note du Centre for European Reform, signés Katinka Barysch, Steven Everts et Heather Grabbe, soulignent que malgré tous les problèmes qui se posent, la Turquie serait non pas un fardeau, mais bien un atout de poids pour l’Union. 

Introduction

Many Turks heaved a sigh of relief in December 2004, when EU leaders declared that Turkey could start accession negotiations in October 2005. Some 40 years after the EU had first opened up the prospect of membership, that goal finally appeared to be within reach. Yet as the opening of those accession talks approaches, the mood in Turkey is decidedly sombre. The EU is preoccupied with its own internal problems, following the collapse of its constitutional treaty and bitter rows over the EU budget. Recent polls show that a majority of West Europeans are now against Turkish membership. Germany’s likely next chancellor, and most of the plausible candidates for France’s presidential elections, are openly arguing for a ‘privileged partnership’ instead of full EU membership. Meanwhile, reforms within Turkey have slowed, and the Turkish public is becoming less enthusiastic about EU accession. One thing is clear: Turkish accession will be a long and often difficult journey. And it is only just beginning. 

Despite all the difficulties, it is important to remember the opportunities that Turkey’s accession offers for both sides. The chapters in this pamphlet look at Turkish EU entry from various angles, and they all conclude that Turkey is more likely to be an asset for the EU than a burden. Of course, Turkey’s entry will change the EU. But, as Heather Grabbe argues in Chapter 2, the cosy, cohesive club that many of Turkey’s opponents seek to defend ceased to exist a long time ago. With 25 (soon to be 27) members, the EU is already becoming more diverse and flexible. Turkey will reinforce these existing trends rather than take the EU into a completely new direction. In economics, a young and fast-growing Turkey could add new dynamism to a slow-growing and ageing EU economy. In Chapter 3, I argue for the EU’s existing members to take a long-term view: will the EU still have reasons to worry about Turkish membership in 10 to 15 years time? If Germany, France and other EU countries have not overcome their economic problems by say, 2015, the EU will be sclerotic, inward-looking and unwelcoming. Turkey may well have second thoughts about joining such a club. 

Another key argument in favour of Turkish accession is that the country could add more clout to the EU’s foreign and security policy. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 (it joined even before Germany) and its army is half a million strong. Moreover, with its strategic location and long-standing ties with some Middle Eastern countries, Turkey could greatly help EU efforts to stabilise a highly volatile region. However, as Steven Everts points out in Chapter 4, Turkey may not be suitable as a model for the democratisation of the Middle East, or the Muslim world more generally. Middle Eastern countries regard Turkey’s secular state and its western-leaning policies with a certain amount of suspicion. European politicians should highlight the importance of Turkish accession for the EU’s role in the world. But they should be careful not to over-burden Turkish membership with the claim that it can promote the democratisation of the entire region. 

To read the full text of the paper, visit the Centre for European Reform website.